Production of Presence is a comprehensive version of the thinking of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, one of the most consistently original literary scholars writing today. It offers a personalized account of some of the central theoretical movements in literary studies and in the humanities over the past thirty years, together with an equally personal view of a possible future. Based on this assessment of the past and the future of literary studies and the humanities, the book develops the provocative (...) thesis that, through their exclusive dedication to interpretation, i.e. to the reconstruction and attribution of meaning, the humanities have become incapable of addressing a dimension in all cultural phenomena that is as important as the dimension of meaning. Interpretation alone cannot do justice to the dimension of "presence," a dimension in which cultural phenomena and cultural events become tangible and have an impact on our senses and our bodies. Production of Presence is a passionate plea for a rethinking and a reshaping of the intellectual practice within the humanities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Maturana?Hans Ulrich GumbrechtWhy would a German scholar specializing in pedagogical thought travel thousands of miles to Santiago de Chile for an interview with a aging scientist who, it seems, has created for himself a solid reputation in the field of "biology of vision" without being hailed by his peers as a path-breaking innovator? In the German intellectual context, the answer to this question could be as (...) laconic as it would be superfluous: it consists in a deictic reference to the name and, implicitly, to the work of Niklas Luhmann. American readers, in contrast, may need some introductory explanation in order to understand the epistemological triangle between contemporary pedagogical thought, Maturana's biology, and Luhmann's philosophy—and, above all, in order to assess and even to appreciate its intellectual potential.Niklas Luhmann is certainly difficult to read, at least for starters, and to those who met him during his lifetime he invariably appeared to be a dead-serious person. But today, more than five years after Luhmann's death, we begin to discover traces of a sometimes uncanny irony—one may want to call it a "practical irony"—in his writing. One of the discursive gestures that characterized Luhmann's texts were references to academic authors who nobody had ever heard of (let alone read), presented with the same seriousness and with the same attitude of intellectual reverence that we normally reserve for the classics: for example, to the logician Gotthart Guenter, the philosopher Fritz Heider, the biologist Humberto Maturana, or the mathematician George Spencer Brown. There is no doubt that, in each case, a specific concept or a specific thought developed by one of these authors had turned out to be truly important within Luhmann's own work, and yet the "effects of authority" that his very serious quotes produced were nothing short of hilarious. For Luhmann's readers, with that self-flagellating attitude in which we academics so like to indulge, quite regularly attributed the experience that they had never heard of those seeming "authorities" to their own lack of intellectual cosmopolitanism. This is why, until the present day, some departments of sociology or philosophy in Germany have Spencer Brown or Guenter specialists on their payrolls, and this also explains why some of those authors have had moments of intense reception [End Page 22] in the world of the humanities and social sciences at German universities. Among them, Humberto Maturana, together with his co-author the late Francisco Varela, seem to be the exception confirming the rule that none of those Luhmann references had the intellectual power to survive Luhmann himself.Now why should one trust Luhmann's trust in Maturana? The debate about the importance of Luhmann's thought (he labeled it a "theory of social systems") in the larger context of contemporary Western philosophy has barely begun to become serious, and we are certainly many years away from a definitive consensual evaluation. But there are two—very different—features about Luhmann's work that make him fascinating at first glance. One lies in the simple fact that, probably, no other thinker since Hegel has managed to develop a restrained set of basic concepts and premises into a systematically coherent philosophical edifice of similar proportions. In this sense, entering the dimension of Luhmann's thought offers the patient reader a possibility to view many familiar positions and questions from sometimes radically different innovative angles. Less obvious, however, and more intriguing is Luhmann's intellectual bet to develop his systemic thought under strict avoidance of notions such as "subject," "subjecthood," or "agency." It was this very bet (about whose existential and political motivations he only left some rather vague remarks) that explains Luhmann's fascination for much theoretical thinking emerging from biological research, above all for Humberto Maturana's work. For from a biological perspective, subjecthood and agency are highly marginal attributes in the realm of living organisms. I believe that this (almost hidden) component in Luhmann's thinking can explain the particularly strong affinity of contemporary pedagogical thought in Germany with his work. Of course, such an affinity will not necessarily lead to a pedagogical theory that, in orthodox reliance on Luhmann, will... (shrink)

Considering a range of present-day phenomena, from the immediacy effects of literature to the impact of hypercommunication, globalization, and sports, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht notes an important shift in our relationship to history and the passage of time. Although we continue to use concepts inherited from a "historicist" viewpoint, a notion of time articulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the actual construction of time in which we live in today, which shapes our perceptions, experiences, and actions, is no (...) longer historicist. Without fully realizing it, we now inhabit a new, unnamed space in which the "closed future" and "ever-available past" (a past we have not managed to leave behind) converge to produce an "ever-broadening present of simultaneities." This profound change to a key dimension of our existence has complex consequences for the way in which we think about ourselves and our relation to the material world. At the same time, the ubiquity of digital media has eliminated our tactile sense of physical space, altering our perception of our world. Gumbrecht draws on his mastery of the philosophy of language to enrich his everyday observations, traveling to Disneyland, a small town in Louisiana, and the center of Vienna to produce striking sketches of our broad presence in the world. (shrink)

When it comes to understanding the ontology of individual existence-that is the everyday behaviors that we all perform and hardly ever think about-the voice has a particularly complicated status. Together with writing, voice is the medium expressing ideas that, broadly speaking, we have previously formed in our minds. At the same time, voices trigger vague images and associations that do not have determinate forms. They remain in our memory, and we may even "hear" them as if immediately present, but we (...) are unable to detach the propositional contents they articulate from the centrifugal effects that they have on our lives. Writing in both a personal and philosophical register, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht explores the complexity of the voice as an understudied philosophical, social, and existential phenomenon. He starts out with a focus on its core intellectual problem as "the knot of the voice" - referring to the inseparable proximity between meanings, images, and the physical perceptions on which they depend. In conversation with Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, Lyotard, Luhmann, and above all Roland Bartes, Gumbrecht addresses topics that range from the social functions of the voice to its status in different historical contexts, and to the ways in which the perception of voices animates imagination. Throughout, incisive analyses of moments such as Julius Caesar's purportedly high-pitched voice, the surprisingly fragile authority of God's voice in the Torah and in the Gospel, and Gumbrecht's own personal attachment to the voices of popular singers such as Edith Piaf, Elvis Presley, and Adele, create a portrait of the voice that is both philosophically challenging and entertaining to read. (shrink)

Husserl’s transcendental reduction admits of two motivations: the general methodological ban on begging the question, and the principle that a typology of objects ought to be based on a typology of my ways of cognizing them. As Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology’ agrees with the ‘linguistic phenomenology’ of many analytic philosophers in being at bottom an effort to understand what precisely we mean to say by asserting that there ‘exists’ a ‘consciousness-independent’ or ‘transcendent’ world, the ‘residue’ of transcendental reduction is my subjective (...) consciousness. My cognitive approaches to the latter and to that of somebody else are not only entirely different but ‘complementary’ in the sense of Bohr’s. In the course of searching for an identity criterion for temporal entities lacking a spatial localisation in the world, we can show that the allegedly noetic phenomenon of, say, my now seeing a cat is a noema, to wit, the cat-as-now-beingseen-by-me-in-such-and-such-a-manner. There is no sound base for postulating, over and above the noematic nature of my consciousness, a second, noetic, aspect thereof. (shrink)

Juli Zeh, who enjoys an international reputation, is one of the most gifted and productive writers of Germany today. Her dystopian tale Corpus Delicti: Ein Prozess represents a lively, intelligent, and innovative addition to the genre. It presents a picture of a benevolent dictatorship that demands good health as the highest duty of its citizens, in a sequence of dramatic scenes combining the virtues of a thriller with a dystopia focusing on the present-day preoccupation with health and the body. Most (...) segments are presented as scenes of a trial against a biologist who is accused of rebellion against “The Method,” the ruling order of the future state, whose dominant ideology is “Health as the Principle of State Legitimacy.” Thus metaphysical morality and Enlightenment values such as freedom, democracy, and justice have been replaced by a scientific, secular notion of life as the ultimate criterion and value. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to ask whether what it calls the "presence" of things, including things of the past, can be rendered in language, including the language of historians. In Part I the essay adumbrates what it means by presence . It also proposes two ideal types: meaning-cultures , and presence-cultures . In the modern period, linguistic utterance has typically come to be used for, and to be interpreted as, the way by which meaning rather than presence is (...) expressed, thereby creating a gap between language and presence. Thus, in Part II the essay explores ways that this gap might be bridged, examining seven instances in which presence can be "amalgamated" with language. These range from instances in which the physical dimensions of language itself are made manifest, to those through which the physicality of the things to which language refers is supposed to be made evident. Of particular note for theorists of history are those instances in which things can be made present by employing the deictic, poetic, and incantatory potential of linguistic expression. The essay concludes in Part III with a reflection on Heidegger's idea that language is the "house of being," now interpreted as the idea that language can be the medium through which the separation of humans and the things of their environment may be overcome. The hope of achieving presence in language is no less than a reconciliation of humans with their world, including—and of most interest to historians—the things and events of their past. (shrink)

These conference proceedings consider visual and literary images of ancient Rome created by artists and scholars from Late Antiquity until the present day. The occasion for the conference was the colossal panorama Rome 312 by Yadegar Asisi that was displayed in Leipzig. The papers explore the ways and means by which the idea of Rome was developed by the individual artists and authors and transferred to the cultural context of the epoch and of the personalities involved.

The author discusses Niklas Luhmann's concept of ethics and morals. Therefore he sketches the main traits of Luhmann's theory of systems (e.g. the terms autopoiesis, system and environment, code and programme). From the system-theoretical point of view, ethics are characterized as the reflexive theory of morals. Morals are described as the communication of regard or disregard. The author shows which consequences follow from this concept by discussing problems concerning several subsystems at the same time. The problems of Luhmann's theory of (...) morals and ethics are demonstrated by analyzing the concepts of risk and responsibility. Finally, the author demands that ethics should be understood even more as social ethics which reflect upon their social foundation in a more consequent way. (shrink)

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.

Summary Ordinary language philosophers frequently draw on the fact that an appropriately selected sentential combination of the form p but not q can, or cannot, be uttered without absurdity; however, they do so without sufficient reflection on the methodology of such combination tests, which results in considerable shortcomings even in practical application. To improve things, I shall discuss two criteria for distinguishing ‘pragmatic’ from ‘non-pragmatic’ implications and for separating the latter into ‘linguistic’ (‘semantic’ and ‘syntactical’) and ‘non-linguistic’ ones (2–3); consider (...) the bearing of the principle of ‘sense-constancy‘ on the applicability of combination tests (4); and call attention to the important, though merely heuristic, function of investigating pragmatic, as opposed to semantic, implications (5.1–5.2). Finally, I shall hint at a striking analogy between the linguistic (yet non-empirical) method of combination tests, the phenomenological method of ‘fictional variation’, and the empirical method of ‘conjectures and refutations’ (5.3). (shrink)

Adopting an ontology of full concreteness , one has to distinguish between human action in the internal view of the actor himself and human action in the external view of a fellow human being, or spectator. As seen from the latter point of view, human action is nothing but observable behavior. As such, it belongs in the objective realm of natural necessity, as does any other macrophysical event . As seen from the former point of view, human action may be (...) characterized as a system of non-indicative subjective traits of the actor's intentional objects, appealing to him, in the light of his motives, in a 'gerundive' way. As such, it does not belong in the objective realm of natural necessity, and is free, moreover, in the positive sense that the actor could have acted otherwise. If these perspectives are commingled - as there is a strong tendency to do by arguing, or construing, from analogy -, the result is confusion. But if they are seen as disjunct alternatives, the result is complementarity in the sense of Bohr. However, we must not misconstrue such complementarity as a dual-aspect-conception, for there seems to be no good sense in saying that action as a system of non-indicative subjective traits and action as objective behavior are but two aspects of one and the same human action 'in itself', i.e., irrespective of the modes of subjective givenness. Auf dem Boden einer Ontologie der vollen Konkretion muß man zwischen dem menschlichen Handeln in der Innensicht des Handelnden selbst und dem menschlichen Handeln in der Außensicht eines Mitmenschen unterscheiden. Vom Standpunkt eines mitmenschlichen Zuschauers aus ist menschliches Handeln nichts anderes als beobachtbares Verhalten; als solches gehört es, genau wie jedes andere makrophysikalische Ereignis, ungeachtet mikrophysikalischer Indeterminismen in den objektiven Bereich der Naturnotwendigkeit. Vom Standpunkt des Handelnden selbst aus läßt sich menschliches Handeln dagegen als ein System motivbedingter 'gerundiver' Charaktere der subjektiven Bezugsgegenstände des jeweils Handelnden kennzeichnen; als solches gehört es nicht in den objektiven Bereich der Naturnotwendigkeit und ist überdies auch in dem positiven Sinne frei, daß der Handelnde auch anders hätte handeln können. Wenn man beide Perspektiven vermengt - und es gibt eine starke Tendenz, dies aufgrund von Analogieschlüssen oder analogisierenden Auffassungen zu tun -, entsteht Konfusion; aber wenn man die beiden Perspektiven als disjunkte Alternativen sieht, ergibt sich Komplementarität im Sinne Bohrs. Wir dürfen solche Komplementarität freilich nicht als eine Zwei-Aspekte-Konzeption mißdeuten; denn man scheint nicht wirklich sinnvoll sagen zu können, Handeln als ein System von gerundiven subjektiven Charakteren und Handeln als objektives Verhalten seien nur zwei Aspekte einer und derselben menschlichen Handlung 'an sich', nämlich ohne Rücksicht auf ihre subjektiven Gegebenheitsweisen. (shrink)

In light of the detailed biographical studies of the past two decades, Martin Heidegger's active pursuit of ideological proximity to the National Socialist state should no longer elicit astonishment or intellectual revulsion. The language of facts speaks too clearly to allow room for euphemism, but too clearly as well on the other side to support demonizing speculations about Heidegger's absolute ideological orthodoxy or even a hypothetical powerful political influence, as recently attempted again by the French philosopher Emannuel Faye. From the (...) early 1930s and probably until the end of the war, Heidegger wanted to prove himself a good National Socialist…. (shrink)

Über mehrere Generationen von persönlichen Schülern und akademischen Lesern hat die Arbeit des Mediävisten Hugo Kuhn (1909-1978) eine belebende Wirkung auf die Literaturwissenschaft in Deutschland entfaltet, die mittlerweile nur noch selten an seinen Namen oder an einzelne seiner Schriften gebunden ist. Diese unter konventionellen Blickwinkeln kaum zu greifende Rezeptionsgeschichte erschließt sich aus dem Gestus eines singulären intellektuellen Stils. Immer wieder wurde Kuhn die Begegnung mit Texten der Vergangenheit zum Auslöser für philosophische Gedankenbewegungen, die sich eher im Eröffnen von Horizonten des (...) Experimentierens als in der Verdichtung zu kohärenten Thesen oder in Ergebnissen historischer Einsicht bewährten. Eine Retrospektive auf das hinterlassene Werk konfrontiert uns mit der Aufgabe, dem Potential solcher Impulse einen Raum und eine Funktion in der Gegenwart zu geben. (shrink)

There has been much speculation among intellectuals and philosophers about the qualitative changes in our habits of communication that have come with electronic technology - so much so that we have perhaps neglected the most obvious quantitative effect: without any doubt, human beings have never been obliged to communicate as frequently as is the case in our electronic present - with the unsurprising and well known consequence that we constantly feel "behind" in our electronic obligations to communicate. From a (pseudo-) (...) ethical point of view, the even more oppressive flip side of this phenomenon is one's need to be constantly "available," the result of which we all know: seminar discussions, religious services, or moments of erotic delight interrupted by ringing cellphones or by a constant anxiety that one needs to check one's e-mail. The main interest of this essay is to explore the existential consequences of this new - and enslaving - law of "universal availability." But this entire polemic is accompanied by the author's concession that his own - very subjective - reaction to electronic communication may well be the (legitimate) reaction of old age. (shrink)

Kant setzt sich im Vorwort seiner Schrift "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft" mit dem Vorwurf auseinander, die Deduktion der Verstandeskategorien in der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" würde dem Gedanken einer prästabilierten Harmonie Vorschub leisten. Gleichsam ins kritische Mark getroffen weist er diesen Gedanken der dogmatischen Metaphysik zurück. Nicht zuletzt durch diesen Vorwurf angeregt überarbeitet er für die zweite Auflage seiner Kritik insbesondere die Deduktion, die sich nun in zwei Schritten vollzieht. Die Überlegungen sollen verdeutlichen, daß sich diese zwei Schritte zum einen (...) als ein analytisches und zum anderen als ein synthetisches Argument verstehen lassen. 1790 deutet Kant in seiner sogenannten "Streitschrift gegen Eberhard" allerdings in der Tat den Gedanken einer prästabilisierten Harmonie an. Wenngleich er damit eine Argumentationslücke in seinem transzendentalphilosophischen System offenbart, läßt sich doch zeigen, daß er auch hier nicht in dogmatische Metaphysik zurückfällt, sondern vielmehr aus empirischer Sicht die "Zusammenstimmung" der Erkenntnisvermögen Sinnlichkeit und Verstand erörtert. (shrink)

Conversation about expected translation into Ukrainian of Gumbrecht's book Production of Presence. What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stanford UP: Stanford, 2004).

Everyfan -- Definitions : praise, beauty, athletics -- Discontinuities : demigods, gladiators, knights, ruffians, sportsmen, Olympians, customers -- Fascinations : bodies, suffering, grace, tools, forms, plays, timing -- Gratitude : watching, waste.

Mit dieser Edition wird erstmals ein Vorlesungszyklus aus Helmuth Plessners wissenschaftlichem Nachlaß der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht. Das klar und übersichtlich gegliederte Kolleg "Elemente der Metaphysik" präsentiert in leicht verständlicher Sprache und gut nachvollziehbarer Gedankenentfaltung die Grundzüge von Plessners Anthropologie, die dieser in seinem nur schwer rezipierbaren Hauptwerk, den "Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch" von 1928, entwickelt hatte, und stellt sie in einen umfassenden philosophischen Kontext. Die Vorlesung umfaßt drei Hauptteile: Im 1. Teil, der "Metaphysik des Bewußtseins", zeigt Plessner, daß (...) der klassische bewußtseinsphilosophische Ansatz zur Beantwortung zentraler metaphysischer Probleme nicht in der Lage ist. Die entscheidende Frage nach dem Sein des Bewußtseins ist – wie Plessner nachweist – im Rahmen der Bewußtseinsproblematik, wie sie von der neuzeitlichen Philosophie seit Descartes entfaltet wurde, nicht zu beantworten. Die Bewußtseinsphilosophie muß daher – so Plessners Grundthese – durch einen lebensphilosophischen Ansatz überwunden werden. Dieser Übergang zur Problematik des Lebens und die breite Ausführung des neuen philosophischen Zugriffs steht im Mittelpunkt des 2. Teils. Plessner unternimmt hier vor allem den Versuch, das Wesen des Lebens durch das Verhältnis des Körpers zu seiner Grenze zu bestimmen und hält fest, daß solche Körper, die ihre Grenzen realisiert haben, "Positionaliät" besitzen. Dieser Begriff der Positionalität wird zum Zentralbegriff von Plessners Biophilosophie, die im Fortgang dieses Teils der Vorlesung ausführlich dargestellt wird. Im Zentrum der Darlegung, die Plessner im engen, kritischen Kontakt mit der biologischen Forschung hält, steht u.a. die Beziehung von Organismus und Umwelt, die Organisationsformen des Lebens, die Struktur der tierischen Umwelt, die Bestimmung des Bewußtseins, das Verhältnis von Bewußtsein und körperlichem Sein und das Problem des Gedächtnisses. Im abschließenden 3. Teil skizziert Plessner die Grundzüge seiner philosophischen Anthropologie, wobei er den Menschen als dasjenige Lebewesen bestimmt, das – in Abhebung vom Tier, dem eine zentrische Organisationsform zukommt – eine "exzentrische Positionalität" besitzt, und das in einem dreifachen Bezug zur Außenwelt, zur Innenwelt und zur Mitwelt steht. Die besondere Bedeutung dieser Vorlesung liegt einerseits in ihrem Charakter als leicht nachvollziehbare Hinführung zu Plessners Philosophie des Lebendigen. Andererseits enthält sie neue Inhalte – insbesondere im 1. und 2. Teil – und trägt dadurch zur Erweiterung unserer Kenntnis von Plessners Philosophie bei. (shrink)

In a first retrospective of Niklas Luhmann's work, it is surprising to see that concepts regarding time and temporality received comparatively little attention. This article starts with the hypothesis that, over the years, Luhmann tended to subsume and deal with topics regarding time under the notion of `contingency'. Identified as the central ` Eigenwert' of modern societies, Luhmann seems to suggest that contingency ended up modifying the three classical time dimensions. In the case of the future dimension, the question arises (...) of what effect a modification of contingency through contingency as social Eigenwert might yield. The answer proposed is that this effect lies in our contemporary tendency to see the future as a field of risk-calculation. (shrink)